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ABSTRACT
The illicit drug crops opium and coca are conventionally regarded as sources of
instability, an ‘evil’ that breeds fragility and violence. Fragile states are supposed
to be most vulnerable to their production and consequent harms. Yet by
looking into the local contexts of the world’s leading opium and coca
producers – Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia and Bolivia – these illicit crops
are found to also be sources of stability, even drivers of economic growth.
They enable marginalized communities and territories abandoned by the
state to be reinserted into national and global markets. Within so-called
‘fragile’ and conﬂict-aﬀected areas are displaced and dispossessed
households adopting innovative and unorthodox strategies for coping and
survival in changing and insecure environments. This paper maps out an
approach, useful for examining the resilience that has emerged amidst
violence and uncertainty in illicit-crop-producing territories, and which can
hopefully tackle the continuing disconnect between drugs and development
policy.
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Introduction: the disconnects of drugs and development policies
The ‘drug problem’ remains today as one of the most diﬃcult policy challenge for the United Nations,
donor agencies, and national governments. Despite decades-long eﬀorts and billions of dollars used to
fund its eradication, including deadly ‘wars on drugs’, illicit trades in opium and coca continue to
expand. In 2018, the World Drug Report estimated total global opium production at 10,500 tons,
‘easily the highest estimate recorded by the UNOﬃce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) since monitor-
ing started at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century’. Similarly, global cocaine manufacture in 2016
reached ‘its highest level ever: 1410 tons’ (UNODC, 2018a, pp. 1 and 8).
One explanation for such extraordinary resilience to prohibition is that these crops are global
commodities whose market values have been multiplied, ironically, by prohibition. Global opium
harvests in 2016–2017 were oﬃcially estimated to be between 9100 and 9400 tons – out of which
700 to 1050 tons of heroin were processed. That is equivalent – using the often-cited observed retail
street price of heroin in London at US$135,000 per kilogram – to a potential global annual turnover
of between US$94.5 billion to US$141.75 billion. Similarly, global turnover of cocaine sales is huge at
US$ 169.2 billion, based on the street prices of cocaine in Chicago at US$120,000 per kilogram
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Eric Dante Gutierrez ericdantegutierrez@gmail.com
GLOBALIZATIONS
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1718825
(Reuter & Trautmann, 2009, p. 23).1 In comparison, the global trade in cane sugar is estimated as
worth US$69.7 billion in 2018; while the global business in coﬀee is estimated at US$107.8 billion
in 2019.2
When including into consideration the full scope of opium and coca’s supply and distribution
chains, it becomes clear that the illicit commerce is of a magnitude likely to leave almost no aspect
of development untouched. Like sugar and coﬀee, its sheer size and scope will shape access to land
and markets; aﬀect the creation of employment; sway trends in banking; and drive cross-border
ﬁnancial ﬂows. It will also likely aﬀect public services; inﬂuence political decision-making; and
change processes on who gets to wield power, among others. In other words, the impact and con-
sequences – intended and unintended – are signiﬁcant.
One illustration of impact comes from the 2012 US Senate investigation of HSBC, one of Europe’s
biggest banks, over how its global bank notes business and other ﬁnancial services laundered billions
of dollars for a Mexican drug cartel.3 US prosecutors, however, did not criminally charge HSBC;
instead, an out-of-court settlement was agreed wherein the bank paid an unprecedented ﬁne of
US$1.9 billion and issued a public apology. HSBC received protection too from the British govern-
ment, which told relevant US authorities that a revocation of HSBC’s banking license would not only
lead to thousands of jobs lost, but more importantly, threaten another ‘global ﬁnancial disaster’ right
after the 2008 global ﬁnancial meltdown.4 This case shows how the illicit commerce in drugs has
become ﬁrmly embedded in the world’s licit banking and ﬁnancial systems.
There is a practical problem, however, in further observing and analysing impact: the illicit drugs
trade is almost always regarded only as a law enforcement, and not a development problem as well.
This understanding is based on faulty assumptions – such as, that the boundaries between ‘licit’ and
‘illicit’ are clearly delineated. As the HSBC case shows, drug cartels use banks to launder drug proﬁts,
blurring the lines between legal and illegal. Blind spots and stereotypes are therefore created and
reproduced, leading to a tendency in analysis and policy responses to rely on a ‘single story’,5
thus risking a critical misunderstanding of the phenomenon. Also created is a disconnect between
drugs and development policies.
That disconnect is no better reﬂected than in the ﬂagship products of two global institutions – (a)
the Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCD) of the World Bank Group (WBG); and (b) the World
Drug Reports (WDR) of the UNODC. The SCDs examine economic development problems to
inform the WBG’s strategy for a particular country.6 Because the WBG is also a ‘Knowledge
Bank’, the SCDs are, arguably, a most authoritative oﬃcial socioeconomic and ﬁscal assessment
of a country under review. Yet the SCDs suﬀer from a fundamental ﬂaw: it barely notices illicit econ-
omies and its impact on local communities. SCDs for the world’s two main opium-producing
countries, Myanmar (November 2014) and Afghanistan (February 2016), gave only passing mention
of opium. Coca-producing Colombia’s SCD (June 2015) barely mentions ‘coca’; while Bolivia’s SCD
(June 2015) makes no mention at all (World Bank, 2014; 2015a; 2015b; and 2016).
It is as if the WBG avoided to consider illicit crop economies, because this ﬁeld is regarded as the
sole domain of the UNODC. Yet the omission is mutual. Despite the availability of relevant data and
analysis – such as employment levels, job creation, access to credit, or the availability and reliability
of infrastructure – the UNODC’s WDRs do not cite the WBG’s SCDs in its analysis of, for example,
employment levels, access to credit, or other socioeconomic trends in the illicit-crop-producing ter-
ritories it surveys. Thus, on one hand, UNODC data and analyses are not intensively used by the
WBG; and on the other, the WBG’s development data are not used by the UNODC. The mutual
omissions are a source of methodological and analytical weakness in both sets of reports.
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These omissions are serious mistakes. Among others, it leads to a failure to acknowledge and ana-
lyse the paradox – that illicit economies, though a driver of criminal activity, may also be a source of
order under certain conditions; and that its criminal actors, though drivers of predation and violence,
can be development actors too, no matter how counter-intuitive that may seem. Opium shapes
Myanmar’s ‘triple transition’ – described as the change from military to democratic governance;
from a centrally-directed, closed economy to a market-oriented one; and from 60 years of conﬂict
towards peace in the border areas (WB, Nov. 2014, p. 7). In Afghanistan, opium creates jobs and
is a main source of cash in places not reached by development aid. In Colombia, coca plays a key
role for coping and survival in neglected territories settled by those displaced and dispossessed by
the country’s multiple conﬂicts and agricultural commercialization. Bolivia had a president installed
in oﬃce on the strength of its indigenous cocalero movement (New York Times, 18 Dec 2005).
The disconnect explains the fundamental conundrum. Drug policy could not solve the so-called
‘drug problem’, as evidenced by the failure of prohibition.7 Solutions may perhaps be found in the
application of development policy, but current development orthodoxy, as reﬂected in the WBG’s
approach, remains far too limited and unable to penetrate the interdependencies – i.e. the ‘whys’
and ‘hows’ of coping and survival in illicit-crop-producing territories with high levels of violence
and conﬂict.
Despite the disconnect, it is essential to emphasize that the WBG and UNODC share some com-
mon understanding – they have more or less similar assumptions over illicit economies and its sup-
posed harms. This paper is an examination of these assumptions, a step that may be key for
unravelling the paradox of illicit economies. This paper ﬁrst groups these assumptions into four
threads, and then attempts its unpacking and deconstruction. This elaboration is necessary, because
collectively, drugs and development agencies get to deﬁne to a signiﬁcant degree what is presumed to
be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in illicit-crop-producing territories. These assumptions, whether explicit or
implicit, get to be the frameworks for understanding; they construct the dominant depictions
with which these territories are typically framed. These assumptions are perhaps why resilience –
the innovative and unorthodox strategies for coping and survival in the constantly changing and
insecure environments of illicit-crop-producing territories – remains a blind spot in drugs and devel-
opment policy orthodoxy.
The central theme across this paper’s examination is interdependency, the notion ﬁrst elaborated
by Anton Blok in his opus The Maﬁa of a Sicilian Village: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs
(1974). Blok’s basic contention is that criminal actors are essentially embedded in society, the econ-
omy, and state institutions, and are therefore necessarily engaged or locked in interdependent
relationships, whether friend or foe, with other actors. As such, criminal actors are not just plain
gangsters or racketeers for the simple reason that they make decisions that aﬀect the public.
Blok’s ﬁeld work in Sicily showed how the Maﬁosi became the force for change that shaped the eﬀec-
tive distribution of land, patterns of land use, and the consequent division of labour resulting from
shifts into livestock raising. Most importantly, it was more the Maﬁosi rather than capital, Blok
emphasized, that principally re-organized peasant society into more commercial forms of agricul-
ture. Hence, the realm of the criminal entrepreneur is the public, where he or she establishes inter-
dependencies with other socioeconomic and socio-political actors (Blok, 1974, p. 6; and tables on
245–252).8
Michael Watts recently called for a revival of interest into Blok’s work, because the Maﬁa of a
Sicilian Village oﬀers a view at odds with much of the economics-dominated work of the 1990s
and 2000s. While these literatures, ‘see maﬁa exclusively as a perverse market response to modern-
ization and commercialization in a context in which the state fails to protect property’, Blok takes a
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substantively diﬀerent view, points out Watts, by construing the maﬁa as brokers in violence that
kept restive peasants in submission, but in ways that are starkly ‘diﬀerent from its feudal predeces-
sors who acted mainly as armed retainers for maintaining law and order of vested interests in the
countryside’. The ‘mediating functions’ of feudal armed retainers ‘were minimal and strictly local
phrased’, while those of the Maﬁosi ‘attain major strength and signiﬁcance in connection with the
impact of the State and the advent of the market’. Blok shows that it is the collusion, cohabitation
and contiguity with the state and forms of public authority which are central to the maﬁa’s repro-
duction (Watts, 2016).
Thus, the principal diﬀerence between the licit and the illicit entrepreneur may simply be the
socially constructed and politically applied label ‘criminal’, because both are after all involved in
similar processes of commodiﬁcation of crops, accumulation of wealth and assets, and appropriation
of labour. The coercive specialization of criminal entrepreneurs does not make them less or more
reliant than licit capitalists on interdependent relationships. As Abraham and Van Schendel note,
there is an uncanny symmetry between criminal networks and strategic business models. The domi-
nant imagery of nation-states ﬁghting valiantly against global criminal networks, as represented in
institutions like the UNODC and the WBG, ‘is far too simplistic and even misleading’. The labels
‘illegal’ or ‘criminal’ are applied to those who defy the norms and rules of formal political authority,
‘but they are quite acceptable, “licit”, in the eyes of the participants in these transactions and ﬂows’
(2006, pp. 3–4). Nordstrom points out that trillions of dollars move around the world outside legal
channels, ﬂowing through millions of hands, thousands of institutions and hundreds of borders, as
‘they ruin the lives of some and create vast empires of proﬁt for others’ (2007, p. xvi)
A short note on the methodology is necessary. To support its claims, this paper uses comparative
analysis, drawn from existing discussions of speciﬁc local contexts and cases that cover almost all
illegal opium production (Afghanistan and Myanmar) and the vast majority of coca production
(Colombia and Bolivia). Thus, this paper does not present new empirical material. Rather, what is
new is that it uses carefully selected material from these countries in a comparative way to unpack
the discourses on global drugs policy. This comparative approach has been suggested as a way to
tackle the research problems that emerge when much of the phenomenon under study remains hid-
den; when available data is uneven; and when the conditions with a bearing on the analysis are often
incomplete or piecemeal (Mollinga & Gondhalekar, 2014). A single case may indeed provide inten-
sive examination, but could not constitute the grounds for valid generalization, or for disproving an
established generalization (Levi-Faur, 2005 and 2006). Inferences are then developed from the com-
parison of the material gathered, a process similar to Hospers’ explanation that when we see bear
tracks in the mud, we can infer that a bear has been there, even if we didn’t see one (1990, p. 72).
Systematic comparisons, therefore, can be a useful strategy to address the limitations of knowledge
on phenomena that are hidden, understudied, piecemeal, or incomplete, and can potentially generate
new insights and inferences through which long-running divides on drugs and development policy
may be better addressed.
Thread 1: ‘Fragile states are most vulnerable to illicit crop production and
its harms’ – the case of Afghanistan and Helmand
A central and widely held assumption of both drugs and development agencies is that fragile states9
are most vulnerable to illicit crop production and its harms. Illicit drug crops are understood to be a
cause, or at least an essential attribute, of violent conﬂict. As the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs
(CND) stated in its 2009 Political Declaration, ‘drugs infect society through open wounds’, and
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fragile states are understood to be among those ‘open wounds’.10 Fragile states not only provide
safe havens for criminals but are also the most likely places where illicit crops could be grown
‘with impunity’. Afghanistan is one such ‘deeply fragile and conﬂict-aﬀected state’, stated the
2016 SCD in its opening sentence. And indeed, fragility and conﬂict have been emphasized as Afgha-
nistan’s ‘most important constraint’ in addressing poverty and achieving development (WB Group,
2016, pp. 1–25).
These depictions of fragility, conﬂict, and crises are not new. They have been the dominant nar-
ratives on Afghanistan since the 1979 Soviet invasion and after the ouster of the Taliban by US-led
NATO troops in 2001 (Pain & Sutton, 2007, pp. 1–9). These depictions, though, have been chal-
lenged by scholars who criticize the implicit assumption that Afghanistan’s population, particularly
those rural-based and beyond the immediate reach of state or aid institutions, are helpless and
dependent. Rural Afghan society, they argue, have inherent strengths, as seen in the robustness
and resilience of its farming and pastoral systems that enable survival under conditions of extreme
fragility and conﬂict (Fitzherbert, 2007, p. 29).
Afghans, states Pain and Sutton, ‘have been anything but passive and static, adopting brilliant,
innovative and unorthodox strategies to secure food, livelihoods and stability in a shifting and inse-
cure environment’ (2007, p. 3). The key point is that there is a need to recover and examine the ‘min-
utiae of coping and survival that has been all but erased’ in development orthodoxy. Attention needs
to be drawn to the ‘interdependencies of production, livelihoods and the mosaic of environments at
even the small scale’ or to the ‘multi-layered livelihood strategies which include migration, manipu-
lation of aid, remittances, and of course, narcotics production’ (Pain & Sutton, 2007, pp. 3–5).
Thus, the dominant depiction of fragility is but a ‘convenient device’ to tell a story that supports a
particular, state-centred, aid-dependent, and elite-focused humanitarian and development agenda
(Pain, 2007, pp. 11–26). Fitzherbert is scathing, stating that these orthodoxies are ‘frequently simplis-
tic, outdated, and ignorant, or based on a perspective that overvalues the role of state and aid
agencies in agricultural recovery and change’ (2007, p. 29). Especially in volatile rural areas, informal
and local structures persist in spite of the fragility and conﬂict, ‘consolidating the resilience born of
centuries of survival in a harsh and unforgiving land’ (Pain & Sutton, 2007, pp. 2–3).
David Mansﬁeld is another strong critic. Data produced by the UNODC, he states, reinforce the
portrayal of ‘the farmer’ in accordance with neoclassical economic theories of the ﬁrm. He points out
that the simple act in UNODC surveys of categorizing the population into ‘opium poppy farmers’ or
‘non-opium poppy farmers’ implies that ‘those who grow opium are landed and produce nothing
else, while those who do not grow opium poppy on their land are not working on the opium
crop of others’ – assumptions that are ‘ﬂatly untrue’ (2016, pp. 42–43). Mansﬁeld builds up a
‘rural livelihoods approach’, drawing from authors like Alexander Chayanov, who asserted peasants
will prioritize a stable subsistence over that of a higher risk/higher return strategy, and Eric Wolf,
who maintained ‘peasants run a household, not a ﬁrm’ (Mansﬁeld, 2016, pp. 50–51).
The term ‘unintended consequences’11 ﬁnds particular resonance in Helmand Province, where
well-intentioned policies to tackle poorly-understood ‘fragility’ had unfortunately backﬁred. After
the US-led invasion in December 2001, British forces prepared to assume administrative control
of the province. Its aid agency, the Department for International Development (DfID), oﬀered com-
pensation to farmers voluntarily destroying their opium crop, to wean them away from its cultiva-
tion. But the scheme backﬁred, because as it turned out, it incentivized rather than discouraged
opium-growing. In addition, there were cases of local authorities pocketing the money. In 2006,
angry Helmand farmers were still demanding the British to pay for crops destroyed four years
earlier.12
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But perhaps the most important unintended consequence in Helmand was that triggered by the
‘Food Zone Initiative’, a joint eﬀort of the US, UK, and Afghan government in the autumn of 2008 to
reduce instability and dramatically improve Helmand’s food security. Troops were provided; roads
and irrigation were rehabilitated and improved; farmers were given subsidies to grow alternative
crops; and other forms of essential support – credit, agricultural extension, access to markets –
were provided (Mansﬁeld & Fishstein, 2015).
The Food Zone Initiative became an unqualiﬁed success in the short-run, resulting in better pro-
ductivity, higher incomes, and improved food security for participating farmers. But it was precisely
this ‘success’ that triggered the displacement of land-poor households, contends Mansﬁeld and Fish-
stein. The land-owning farmers of Helmand, who previously had to rely on seasonal migrant workers
as farmhands during labour-intensive months, and who typically rented a portion of their smallhold-
ings to sharecroppers as a form of guaranteed income, now found less need for seasonal farmhands
or sharecroppers. Thus, the consequence of ‘success’ meant not only poorer farmhands and share-
croppers losing their livelihoods; they also became excluded from government support because they
were disqualiﬁed, i.e. not registered as owners of property (Mansﬁeld & Fishstein, 2015, pp. 5–8).
The irony is that it was a fairly successful development project, not violent conﬂict, that triggered
the forced migration of the land-poor. They moved north of the Boghra canal beyond the reach of
opium-eradication campaigns, buying desert land from local commanders or arriving as sharecrop-
pers or tenants hoping to save enough from opium cultivation to buy their own land in the future.
With generous loans from opium traders, they constructed deep wells with diesel or solar-powered
pumps that converted desert land to agriculture. As a result, states Mansﬁeld and Fishstein, the once-
desert land planted to opium north of the canal increased from 752 hectares in 2002 to 34,270 hec-
tares in 2012, a 45-fold increase (Mansﬁeld & Fishstein, 2015).
A 2016 video fromAlcis, a research andmapping ﬁrm, documents opium’s role in converting over
300,000 hectares of desert into agricultural land, sustaining the livelihoods of over 1.2million people in
the largely desert southwest from 2000 to 2015.13 The 2016 SCD statement that Afghanistan’s ‘unrec-
orded export of opium’ is ‘large’, or ‘7–8% of GDP’, makes it even more of a puzzle why the impact of
the illicit crop has been omitted in the WBG’s analysis. Opium is not insigniﬁcant to Afghanistan.
An argument can now be made that for the poorest and land-poor, survival comes less from
oﬃcial development aid and state interventions, and more due to engagement with expanding sha-
dow and informal economies. Contrary to the common belief that engaging in illicit trade is simple
criminality motivated by greed and need, the decisions taken are not simplistic: it is based on poor
households’ evaluation of risk and opportunities, including getting protection elsewhere when they
could not expect it from state institutions. Opium cultivation by poverty-stricken and land-poor
farmers in Afghanistan is a resilience strategy.
In summary, the dominant interpretation that ‘fragile states are most vulnerable to illicit crop
production and its harms’ is at best an incomplete assessment of what is actually going on. Within
so-called fragile states are resilient communities, many of which adopt innovative and unorthodox
strategies, and build interdependencies with licit and illicit actors, to secure assets, livelihoods, and
security in constantly changing and insecure environments.
Thread 2: ‘Fragility, violence and illegality breed each other’ – the case of Colombia
and Putumayo
The dominant depiction of areas with thriving illicit economies as unruly, disorderly, or less civilized
frames a picture of lawlessness or absence of local order. This obscures attention – and development
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aid – from being focused on the structures, norms and adaptations for coping and survival amidst
the violence and conﬂict. It distorts the understanding of the relationships (or lack of it) between
marginalized communities and state institutions. It fails to appreciate the dilemmas – for example,
that criminals, belligerents, and ordinary people caught in conﬂict may have agendas that, while
completely diﬀerent from each other oftentimes overlap and may even merge temporarily. More
importantly, drugs and development orthodoxy seldom see the agency of local people. The con-
clusion that emerges is that because the world’s leading producers of illicit crops and drugs, Colom-
bia and Afghanistan, are beset by violence and conﬂict, it therefore follows that fragility, violence and
illegality can be thought to breed each other. But as will be pointed out below, at least two Colombian
scholars have argued strongly against such framing, emphasizing that it is not the unruliness, dis-
order, or illicit crop production that are the fundamental problems, but the marginalization and
exclusion of subsistence peasant communities caused by the structural inequalities of the political
economy subsequently heightened by violence and conﬂict.
To elaborate on these claims, it is useful to begin with a simple comparison of the world’s top coca
producer with the world’s top opium producer (Table 1).
Like Afghanistan, Colombia’s violence is brutal and has been going on now for more than 60
years, according to the Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, a public body reconstructing the his-
tory of conﬂict that has caused over 218,000 deaths and displaced over 5.7 million people (CNMH,
2012). CNMH traces the roots back to the 1948 El Bogotazo urban insurrection that destroyed the
centre of Bogota, which started La Violencia – the period of partisan conﬂict between Liberals and
Conservatives through the 1940-1950s. In the next decades, the violence expanded into a left-wing
insurgency (CNMH, 2012, p. 1). From 1985 to 1989, there came a huge surge in the violence. In
November 1985, the M-19 guerrilla group attacked the Palace of Justice in central Bogota and
held hostage the entire Supreme Court. Following a brutal military response, around 300 people,
including twelve justices of the 25-member Supreme Court, were killed (New York Times, 10 Nov
1985). Four years later, from August to December 1989, drug traﬃckers went to war in response
to eﬀorts to, among others, capture Pablo Escobar. By early October 1989, Colombian police had
linked 142 deadly bomb attacks to the Medellin cartel, with up to 88 car bombs exploded at
banks, hotels and malls in major Colombian cities. An Avianca commercial airliner, reportedly
Table 1. Essential ﬁgures on the top two illicit drug crop producers.
Afghanistan – opium and heroin Colombia – coca and cocaine
Population 2017 35.53 million 49.06 million
GDP 2017 (WB ﬁgures) $19.54 billiona $314.46 billionb
Land area 652,864 square kilometres 1.142 million square kilometres
Land area planted to illicit crop 328,000 hectares (78%) of world total of
420,000 hectares (UNODC, 2018b, p. 12)
146,000 hectares (68.5%) of world total of 213,000
hectares (UNODC, 2018b, p. 29).
Illicit crop production level 9000 tons (85%) of 10,500 tons of opium
produced globally in 2017 (UNODC, 2018b,
p. 12).
No ﬁgures supplied. Since 2014, the UNODC stopped




550–900 tons (66% to 85%) of 1100–1400
tons of heroin produced globally (UNODC,
2018b, p. 13)
Estimated production is 866 tons (61%) of the total of
1410 tons of cocaine produced globally, of which 378
tons were seized in Colombia (UNODC, 2018b, p. 29).
Estimate of the size of the illicit
economy as a proportion of
GDP
SCD states that exports of opium comprise 7-
8% of Afghanistan’s GDP.
The farmgate value of coca leaf production in Colombia
is about 0.2% of GDP, or 3% of the agricultural
sector’s GDP.
Sources: UNODC and WBG (see relevant notes).
aSee https://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan. GDP 2013 was higher at US$ 20.56 billion.
bSee https://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia. GDP 2014 was higher, at US$381.112 billion.
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with two government drug informants as passengers, was also targeted, killing all 107 on board
(New York Times, 30 August 1989; 4 Oct 1989; and 20 Dec 1994).
Though Colombia and Afghanistan share similarities in the intensity and scope of violence, there
is a major diﬀerence: the size of their economies. Colombia’s GDP is more than 16 times the size of
Afghanistan’s. Thus, though beset by violent conﬂict, and for far longer than Afghanistan, Colombia
evades easy categorization as ‘fragile’. It has, at least in theory, resources to deliver ‘comprehensive
service entitlements’, the lack of which deﬁnes ‘fragility’. The stark diﬀerence in economic size also
suggests illegality and violence will not always breed fragility. Colombia’s economy expanded over
the last ﬁfty years, despite the violence. Foreign direct investments continued, showing how ﬁrms
could adapt their business models even to unpredictable and violent local conditions.14
The unequal distribution of economic growth in Colombia, and the inability to distribute the
beneﬁts of growth to large areas that have suﬀered from long-term neglect are widely accepted.
And it is precisely in this regard that the illicit coca economy could be contextualized. Not only
are large quantities of coca being grown in neglected parts of the country. More importantly, the
crops are also grown by campesinos (peasants), those who have been historically marginalized
and excluded from the mainstream economy, state protection, and public services provision.
One key coca-growing area is Putumayo, characterized by its poor infrastructure and largely
agrarian economy. It is also where the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC),
the largest rebel group, has been most active. For the last thirty-ﬁve years, Putumayo has been a
major producer of coca and cocaine. Thus, the central state, explains Maria Clemencia Ramirez, typi-
cally represents Putumayo ‘as uncivilized and disorderly, where inhabitants follow alternatives codes
of behaviour and justice beyond (the state’s) hegemonic control’ (2011: loc. 299).15 Many inhabitants
of Putumayo are colonos, or campesino settlers displaced from other regions by conﬂict and exclu-
sion from the market. They are often depicted as ‘migrants without roots – therefore without any
regional identity’. Since the 1960s, continues Ramirez, they have been portrayed as people ‘in search
of easy money’, or the ‘ﬁrst and weakest link in the global chain of cocaine traﬃcking’. Many are
regarded as either guerrilla supporters or criminals. This stigmatization not only makes them legit-
imate military targets, it also further reinforces their exclusion and marginalization (Ramirez, 2011).
The inclusion of illicit drugs as one of six agenda items in the 2016 government-FARC peace
agreement initially oﬀered promise.16 It included the provision ‘to build a joint and comprehensive
solution to the problem of illicit drugs’, and sought new, evidence-based alternatives that will ‘treat
illicit crop cultivation and drugs consumption diﬀerently from the problem of organised crime.’ But
as pointed out by Ricardo Vargas Meza, the approach agreed is, unfortunately, a reiteration of ortho-
doxy. The agreement, states Vargas, is weak because it fails to even deﬁne the problem of illicit drugs;
does not consider that the criminal economy is able to continue regardless of who controls security
in the producer regions; and the ‘community participation’ it envisages is limited only in relation to
crop substitution, ‘not with regard to life in the territory as a whole’ (Jul 2014, pp. 1–2).17 Ramirez, an
anthropologist who investigated the reasons for the 1996 Cocalero Uprising in southern Colombia,
adds the key critique. She argues that marginalization and exclusion – not illicit crop cultivation,
unruliness, or disorder – are the real problems in coca-producing Putumayo.
Another Colombian scholar, Maria-Clara Torres Bustamante, rejects the depictions of illicit crop
growers as simply passive and unable to inﬂuence the world in which they live. Torres points out, for
example, that the cocaleros of Bajo Putumayo were also creating and developing their own version of
political and social order. Despite their stigmatization, they lobbied for the creation of local munici-
palities in order to bring state institutions closer and become more accessible administrative centres
where they can press for the delivery of public services (2011, pp. 33–68).
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More importantly, Torres points out, it is precisely the illegal coca economy which enabled an
excluded territory and people to be inserted back into the market. Among others, the coca economy
accelerated the use of money in ‘peripheral’ and ‘out-of-the-way’ Putumayo, not only because it
brought more cash, but also because other food crops, such as cassava or corn starch, displaced
by coca, now had to be purchased and transported from other regions, consequently invigorating
those other regions’ agrarian economies. Villages in Bajo Putumayo – La Dorada, La Hormiga
and San Miguel – which became centres of trade in coca paste consequently transformed into
small ‘boom’ towns where hotels were set up, transportation expanded, and demand for goods
like cars, chainsaws, outboard motors, and ﬁrearms increased. The importation of electricity genera-
tors created further downstream stimulation to the local economy. Alongside, migrants from across
the country streamed or migrated to Putumayo in search of livelihood opportunities or seasonal
work in coca farms (2011, pp. 60–68).
As the volume of transactions expanded, a local ﬁnancial system consolidated. Torres documents
how per capita bank deposits in Putumayo grew, from COP (Colombian peso) 179 in 1995, to COP
1049 in 2005, an over ﬁve-fold increase in a decade of coca-led growth.18 Though Torres cautions
that data on banking in Putumayo is unreliable and could not be made the sole basis on the extent
to which the illicit coca trade monetized the local economy (Torres, 2011), the case could still be
made that from a position of extreme isolation, Putumayo became increasingly integrated into
national and global markets as a result of its coca economy.
Whether or not these changes brought by coca constitute genuine development remains debata-
ble. But clearly, the coca economy transformed both state and market structures in Putumayo. In
sum, the dominant notion that fragility, violence and illegality breed each other has stigmatized
coca-growing areas and cocaleros to such an extent that it has become diﬃcult to focus attention
instead on the real and more fundamental problems of marginalization and exclusion. Sadly, such
views have found its way into the ﬁnal peace agreement. Orthodox assumptions on fragility and
its links to violence and illegality are not always true – as demonstrated by Colombia’s overall econ-
omic growth, despite the violence. The case of Putumayo in particular, a marginalized area reinserted
back into national and global markets by its illegal coca economy, opens up to the roles that illicit
economies may serve for the expansion of capital and markets especially among excluded and dis-
placed populations.
Thread 3: ‘Illicit crops and drugs production are sources of instability’ – the case
of Myanmar and Shan State
The failures of drugs and development orthodoxies could be attributed to how interdependency –
symbiosis, quid pro quos, collusion, or other similar relationships that become essential for coping
and survival in contexts of marginalization and exclusion – is continually overlooked. Interdepen-
dency can also be a form of reciprocity created and maintained to better manage risks, or a form
of insurance in constantly shifting and insecure environments. Where there is interdependence, illi-
cit crops could be a source of order, contrary to orthodox understanding.
Interdependency is best illustrated in what Richard Snyder and Angelica Duran-Martinez calls
‘state-sponsored protection rackets’, deﬁned as:
Informal institutions through which public oﬃcials refrain from enforcing the law, or alternatively,
enforce it selectively against the rivals of a criminal organisation, in exchange for a share of the
proﬁts generated by the organisation. (2009, p. 254)
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The beneﬁts from such rackets are not inconsequential, as the case of Myanmar demonstrates.
Before 1990, there were some 25 ethnic armies operating in remote regions, the largest of which
emerged in the borderlands of Shan State. As the conﬂicts dragged on, most if not all insurgent
groups turned to taxing opium cultivation for ﬁnancing their armed struggles. What is curious
however, observed Snyder and Duran-Martinez, is that following the dramatic increase in
opium and heroin production after 1989, the biggest of these opium-ﬁnanced armies, oddly, did
not expand. Neither did they engage in more battles, widened their bases, nor extended the
scope of their operations. Instead, most demobilized, and appeared to have focused instead on
opium-growing to rebuild their lives. Consequently, there was a dramatic reduction in the levels
of violence (2009, p. 262).
The explanation, states the two authors, lies in the military’s successful construction of ‘insti-
tutions of protection’. Such institutions, they explain, could emerge only under certain conditions.
First, state oﬃcials must have a credible capacity to enforce the law. Because without a credible threat
of enforcement, why would criminals pay for non-enforcement? Thus, the stronger the illicit actors,
the stronger and more capable the state must be if it is to successfully induce those illicit actors
to participate in the protection racket. Second, criminal organizations also need to have the capacity
to oﬀer a credible guarantee to ‘share the spoils’, to refrain from violence when needed, share
information, or control ‘public hazards’. Thus, to be credible partners in a protection racket, ‘crim-
inal organisations require a certain level of internal command, control, and coherence’ (Snyder &
Angelica Duran-Martinez, pp. 255–256).
With these conditions apparently met in Myanmar’s borderlands, opium ‘transformed from being
a source of violence into a source of political order’. Opium provided a lucrative ‘exit option’ for bat-
tle-weary rebels looking for a settlement or compromise with the enemies they could not defeat, but
who could neither win anyway. The quid pro quo created ‘a powerful pacifying eﬀect on the illicit
markets’. By 1997, continues Snyder and Duran-Martinez, opiates had become Myanmar’s largest
export, ‘pumping more than half-a-billion dollars annually into the economy, an amount exceeding
the government’s oﬃcial tax revenues’ (2009, p. 269).
The global community was not unaware of the state-sponsored protection racket. For successive
years, the annual International Narcotics Strategy Control Report (INSCR), published by the US
Department of State, had been stating that drug proﬁts have become the seed capital for many
otherwise legitimate commercial and manufacturing enterprises.19 Indeed, in an evaluation of
Myanmar’s anti-money laundering eﬀorts in 2002, Brian P. Joyce conﬁrmed what by then had
become a public secret: ‘As a means of maintaining peace and apparent stability, criminal elements
were not only permitted to engage in illegal activity but also encouraged to invest ill-gotten gains
into legitimate commercial development’ (2002, p. 81). As such, it was illicit enterprise that argu-
ably began the revival of Myanmar’s moribund economy. Over the years, more of these opium-
capitalized legitimate enterprises were tagged in the Specially Designated Narcotics Traﬃckers
(SDNT) List, a database kept and maintained by the US Treasury’s Oﬃce of Foreign Assets Con-
trol (OFAC).20 Some examples:
. Lo Hsing Han’s Asia World Group, reputedly Myanmar’s biggest conglomerate, was on the
Sanctions List for years, linked to drugs and money-laundering investigations. However, after
the US terminated its Burma Sanctions Program in October 2016,21 Asia World has become a
fully legalized and legitimate multinational conglomerate.
. Wei Hseuh-Kang and the Hong Pang Group, along with 26 individuals and 17 aﬃliated compa-
nies involved in construction, gem mining, logging, and commercial agriculture, were included in
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the US Sanctions List in 2008. Wei is the leader of the United Wa State Army, one of the ﬁrst
insurgent groups that signed a ceaseﬁre agreement in 1989.
. In 2003, US Treasury imposed sanctions on Asia Wealth Bank because of ‘unacceptable risks of
money laundering and other ﬁnancial crimes’ related to narcotics traﬃcking. It is chaired by U
Eike Htun, and was Myanmar’s largest private bank until 2003.22
In sum, illegality does not always breed violence, i.e. there is no singular relationship between
illicit crop economies and instability. Although it appears as counter-intuitive, under certain
conditions – as elaborated in the case of Myanmar and Shan State – illicit drugs can transform
from being a source of violence into being a source of stability, and even a driver of economic growth.
This appears to be similarly the situation in Afghanistan and Colombia. An understanding of inter-
dependency – rather than theories of the ﬁrm or instrumentalist theories of violence – appears
necessary to resolve the failures of the orthodoxy.
However, it is necessary not to lose the nuances. Myanmar’s decades of economic isolation – start-
ing with its largely self-imposed isolation from 1962 and expounded by the harsh international sanc-
tions from 1988 – may have created enabling conditions not possible in other contexts. Additionally,
there has also been a resurgence in violence in the opium croplands since 2011, showing that even
apparently stable quid pro quos and relationships of interdependency are subject to wider processes
of social, political and economic change.
Thread 4: ‘Illicit crops are evil’ – the case of Bolivia and the Chapare
A fourth widely-held assumption of the orthodoxy is the notion that illicit crops are a social evil. A
key report to the 1952 UN ECOSOC Enquiry on the Coca Leaf supported views that coca-chewing
populations were ‘little civilised’, needed to be ‘saved’, and that it was only through Christianisation
that the ‘primitive population’ could ‘show themselves to be physically and mentally capable of free-
ing themselves from coca-leaf chewing’ (Wolﬀ, Jan 1952, pp. 3–8). In 1961, no less than the Preamble
of the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs stated that it is the duty of states ‘to prevent and
combat this evil’. The wording is notable, explains Rick Lines, because under international treaty
law, the Single Convention is the only UN treaty ‘characterising the activity it seeks to regulate, con-
trol or prohibit as being “evil”’ (2010, p. 3).
Today, Bolivia, where coca-chewing has been practiced for centuries, leads in reversing these
beliefs, prejudice, and stigmatization. Since the dramatic election of a cocalero, Evo Morales, as
president in 2005, Bolivia has worked to undo the ‘historical mistake’ of banning the coca leaf
under the 1961 Single Convention. Right after assuming the presidency in 2006, Morales convened
a Constituent Assembly to draft a new Constitution to change, among others, the legal status of
coca, causing concern in global drug agencies and the US. By September 2008, Bolivia declared
its open deﬁance when Morales expelled the US Ambassador from the Bolivian capital (Daily Tele-
graph, 12 Sep 2008). Two months later, he went further by expelling the US Drug Enforcement
Administration.
In February 2009, following approval in a referendum, the new constitution went into force. It
stated that,
The State shall protect native and ancestral coca as cultural patrimony, a renewable natural resource of
Bolivia’s biodiversity, and as a factor of social unity. In its natural state coca is not a narcotic. It’s revalu-
ing, production, commercialization and industrialization shall be regulated by law (Article 384, Consti-
tution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia).23
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Speaking before the CND in Vienna on 11 March 2009, Morales stunned his audience by chewing a
bag of coca leaves at the podium. ‘This is a coca leaf’, he said. ‘This is not cocaine. This represents the
culture of the indigenous people of the Andean region’ (Daily Telegraph, 12 Mar 2009). Bolivia then
led a petition for two amendments to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Drugs: the removal of
Article 49-2a which banned the coca leaf; and the removal of the coca leaf from the Treaty’s schedule
of restricted products and substances. When countries led by the US objected, the petition collapsed
in January 2011, well into Morales’ second term. In response, Bolivia oﬃcially withdrew from the
Treaty. But almost immediately, it also announced an application for re-accession, a legal manoeuvre
that gave it, under treaty accession terms, the right to ‘temporarily permit’ coca-chewing in its ter-
ritory for 25 years. Bolivia won time to continue improving its policy of ‘yes to coca, no to cocaine’.
The policy, oﬃcially called the ‘CatoAccord’, explains Thomas Grisaﬃ, legalized the cultivation of
small amounts in speciﬁc zones or ‘catos’ to supply Bolivia’s legal market for coca with pre-set limits.
The sindicatos, or coca growers’ unions, then ensures that growers do not exceed this limit by iden-
tifying where over-production takes place, which are then subject to government-conducted eradi-
cation operations (2015, p. 1). There is inevitable resistance from coca growers to such an approach,
but it is ‘overall deemed fair and well-managed, as shown by the relative absence of open rejection of
the authority of the sindicatos’ (Mortensen & Gutierrez, Jan 2019, p. 66).
Like in Putumayo, many Chapare residents are migrants similarly displaced by upheavals and
changing agrarian economies elsewhere. But these settler families, emphasizes Grisaﬃ, were not reli-
ant on coca alone. They used manual labour in family-run farms to cultivate rice, bananas, and citrus
fruit. Others found work as labourers in coca paste production. It was from these settler-farms that
the self-governing sindicatos emerged, which assumed the role of local governance and ‘responsible
for assigning land, administering justice, taxing the coca trade and undertaking community projects
such as building schools or roads’ (2015, p. 3).
Grisaﬃ points out that coca is not proﬁtable. Rather, ‘it complements subsistence farming and, in
the absence of other income-generating activities, is one of the few pursuits that provide them with
access to cash’. In marginalized economies, cash is needed to pay for schooling, buy clothes, visit the
doctor, or to purchase other daily needs such as cooking oil or salt. To be eligible for a cato of coca,
growers ﬁrst have to gain a land title and their cato measured and oﬃcially registered. To comp-
lement and improve internal controls, the European Union funded a biometric register of producers
and their catos, imprinted on identity cards. Coca control then becomes a community responsibility,
with the sindicato organizing regular inspections, and the community deciding on eradication
measures should production breach the limits (Grisaﬃ, 2015, pp. 3–5).
There remain many problems and issues with the Cato policy, with critics coming from the ranks
of cocaleros themselves. Yet what could not be denied is a signiﬁcant outcome – the Cato policy has
contributed to a sharp reduction in violence. Despite previous episodes of violence and conﬂict,
Bolivia does not have active armed insurgencies nor Colombia-style criminal cartels today. The
achievement is nothing less than remarkable, explains Ursula Durand-Ochoa. The cocaleros were
engaged in contentious politics, had to defend an internationally-outlawed commodity, and made
claims that generated divisive tensions that inhibited social movement unity (2012, pp. 34 and
196). A most important outcome too is that it appears that the Cato policy is enabling more agricul-
tural diversiﬁcation in Bolivia’s coca-growing areas, leading to a gradual but nonetheless steady
reduction in coca cultivation from a peak of 31,000 hectares in 2010, to current levels of 20,000–
22,000 hectares (Mortensen & Gutierrez, 2019, p. 67).
Another scholar, Stewart Prest, has sought to explain Bolivia’s ‘rough peace’, or the avoidance of
armed conﬂict in such a contentious political context. He argues that certain forms of locally-
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embedded governance institutions – such as the sindicatos that assumed governance functions in the
absence of the state – can play an important role in mitigating the likelihood of armed violence.
‘Inclusive communities equipped with governance institutions capable of resolving collective action
problems,’ he emphasizes, ‘are, under a range of conditions, less likely to engage in armed conﬂict
with other communities or the state’ (2015, p. ii).
Thus, Durand-Ochoa’s and Prest’s conclusions are particularly useful for understanding what
may be missing in the other three illicit-crop-producing countries aﬀected by violence and conﬂict.
It provides explanations, according to Prest, for why and how some countries at risk of civil conﬂict,
such as those with unconsolidated political regimes or limited state capacities, like Bolivia, ‘tend to
persist indeﬁnitely in a state of rough, yet durable peace, while others experience conﬂict’ (Prest,
2015 ).
The near elimination of violence, avoidance of criminal enterprise, and institution of self-govern-
ance counters the framing of coca as a social evil. Drug control and development policies have much
to beneﬁt from a careful consideration of Bolivia’s experiences.
Conclusion: interdependency as an approach for connecting drugs
and development policy
This paper has demonstrated the follies of drugs and development policy orthodoxy. Many of the
assumptions about fragility and vulnerability are at best incomplete assessments riddled with
blind spots and oblivious to local agency. Assumptions on supposed links between fragility, violence,
and illegality are not always true. Illegal economies are shown as able to re-insert excluded and mar-
ginalized local economies back into national and global markets, thus enabling the penetration of
capital and investments into displaced populations. Illicit drug crops can transform from being a
source of violence to a source of stability, even a driver of economic growth. Non-state institutions
of local governance can potentially eliminate violence, and over the long-term, pave the way for
diversiﬁed local economies that ultimately eliminates dependence on illicit crops. This examination
provides guidance on what new policy development could focus on to resolve the paradox, as sum-
marized in Table 2.
Policy development to eliminate the disconnect between drugs and development policies is long
overdue, especially because there is no dearth of knowledge and evidence available to policy-makers
for reconsidering current approaches. For example, historical studies have shown that the labelling of
the plant crops opium and coca as ‘illicit’, and its growers and entrepreneurs as ‘criminals’, is a mod-
ern-day social construction that is reﬂective more of power relationships in international treaty law
than the harms these plants actually bring. When used to support colonization, coca and opium were
legal. Coca sustained Spanish mining interests in Latin America in the 1500s (Gagliano, 1994; Goo-
tenberg, 2008), in the same way that opium ﬁnanced the expansion of the British Empire into the Far
East that led to two Opium Wars in China (Trocki, 1999). When the substances morphine, heroin
and cocaine were isolated by German and British chemists in the 1800s, it was European (e.g. Merck;
Bayer) and American (e.g. Parke-Davis) pharmaceuticals that turned it into commodities for mass
consumption (Booth, 1996; Gootenberg, 2001 and 2008). Had Muslim countries been the real
powers behind the United Nations treaties, suggested the historian David Courtwright, it would
be alcohol rather opium and coca that will be on top of the list of substances to be banned (2001).
Experts who studied the criminalization of drug crops, like Bewley-Taylor (2002 and 2012), point
out that it was the United States that internationalized drug prohibition, through which a ‘prohibi-
tion culture’ across the UN built up. Buxton points out too that it is no small irony that the US,
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oftentimes the world’s foremost champion of free trade and the economic theories of capitalism, is
also the global champion of a planned economy for narcotics at the world stage, as it funds,
mobilizes, and uses its vast inﬂuence for drug control (2006, pp. 100, 38).
In conclusion, though illicit economies may enable coping and survival for excluded and mar-
ginalized communities, it is important to reiterate that there are costs involved that could not be
brushed away. Behind the enterprises, commodity chains, and social networks that make up illi-
cit economies lies a form of capitalism that by nature is cruel, criminal, unregulated and exploi-
tative. Communities surviving on the margins often have no choice but to live under its control,
which may mean working under conditions of virtual slavery while criminal bosses reap most of
the proﬁts, or families being forced to give up their daughters as ‘opium brides’ to settle loans
from drug traﬃckers. It is perhaps another paradox – that in overcoming some drivers of pov-
erty, exclusion and marginalization – these communities expose themselves to a new set of risks
and dangers. This makes the resolution of the divides between drugs and development policy
even more urgent.
Indeed, as Norbert Elias explained, ‘underlying all intended interactions of human beings is their
unintended interdependence’. At any given point of economic development, says Elias, people are
bound and dependent on each other in quite speciﬁc ways, producing particular forms of social inte-
gration and tensions (Elias, 1994 [1939], pp. 284–285, 300).
Table 2. Summary.




Fragile states are most vulnerable to illicit crop
production and its harms
Vulnerability to illicit crops is not automatic in fragile
states; focus should be on the agency/resilience of
people
Peasants cultivating drug crops are primarily rational
economic actors
Peasants tend to prioritize stable subsistence over high
return/high risk strategies; peasants run households,
not ﬁrms
Denial of existence and impact of illicit drug
economies
Engagement with illicit economies and actors enable





Fragility, violence and illegality breed each other.
Areas where illicit economies thrive are unruly,
disorderly or less civilized.
The more fundamental problems are marginalization &
exclusion. Illicit economies can serve excluded
populations.
The key problem to be solved in illicit-crop-producing
areas is illicit crop cultivation.
Farmers do not rely on illicit crop production alone.
They adopt multi-layered strategies to build
resilience.
Illicit crop producers are simple receivers of economic
and political signals, and barely have the power to
inﬂuence the world in which they live.
Opium and coca farmers create their own version of
social and political order – including lobbying for
state structures needed for the administration of local
economies.
Illicit economies are distinct and separate from the licit
economy.
Boundaries have become unclear. Illicit economies
enable excluded territories and people to be inserted
back into the market.
Myanmar – Shan
State
Illicit crops and drugs production are sources of
instability. Illicit actors and criminals create chaos
and disorder.
Illegality does not always breed violence. Under certain
conditions, illicit crops can reduce violence and be a
source of stability.
Drug lords and criminals are illegitimate actors who
can only operate in the ‘shadows’.
Drug lords and criminals can gain legitimacy. They can




Illicit drugs are evil. It is right to criminalize illicit drug
crop producers.
The concept of ‘illicit’ is a social construction. Coca-
chewing has never been illicit in Andean culture and
history. Coca-growers are not necessarily criminals.
State-sanctioned and aid-supported eradication
campaigns are necessary to reduce the global
supplies of plant-based drugs.
Social control mechanisms in place of market
mechanisms to control supply are possible.
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Notes
1. There appears some divergence in Reuter and Trautmann’s Table 1 on page 23, due to notations of
‘ounces’ and ‘100 mg. pure’. However, I have used the ﬁgures of $135,000 per kilogram for heroin
and $120,000 for cocaine based on the logic of the table. Note that these authors’ estimates are inferences
into hidden activities, not actually observed sales and consumption.
2. Figures on sugar were sourced from https://www.statista.com/topics/1224/sugar/, while the ﬁgures on
coﬀee came from https://www.statista.com/outlook/30010000/100/coﬀee/worldwide. Last accessed 31
March 2019.
3. See for example, page 41 of the US Senate Report (https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PSI%
20REPORT-HSBC%20CASE%20HISTORY%20(9.6)2.pdf), and various media reports like https://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/business-18867054. Last accessed 31 Mar 2019
4. See https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/11/hsbc-us-money-laundering-george-osborne-
report, accessed 31 March 2019.
5. The phrase ‘danger of a single story’ was coined by Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, who
said single stories create stereotypes which, though not untrue, are incomplete. See https://www.ted.com/
talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story
6. For example, in January 2019, the Bank announced the start of preparations to produce Myanmar’s
SCD. See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2019/01/21/myanmar-systematic-country-
diagnostic, last accessed 31 March 2019.
7. A full discussion of the failures of prohibition is presented in Rolles, Murkin, Powell, Kushlick, and Slater
(2016).
8. The patterns Blok observed in his case study are aﬃrmed in more recent studies, such as Goodhand
(1999), Ahram and King (2012), McSweeney, Richani, Pearson, Devine, and Wrathall (2017) and
Gutierrez-Sanin (2019).
9. Deﬁned as “states that are failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive service
entitlements, or legitimacy” (Stewart & Brown, 2009, p. 3).
10. See page 4 of https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/V0984963-English.pdf, accessed 28 Jan 2019
11. ‘Unintended consequences’ is a widely-used term in drugs policy, having been the title for a series of reports
commissioned by the UN Research Institute for Social Development in 1995. See Tullis (1995).
12. Details and sources of this compensation ﬁasco are in a 2015 Christian Aid report (Gutierrez, 2015,
pp. 4–5).
13. The video can be seen here – https://vimeo.com/173599228, last accessed 31 December 2019.
14. The reasons for the expansion of Colombia’s economy despite the violence and conﬂict is beyond the
scope of this paper. An explanation, however, may be drawn from Francisco Gutierrez-Sanin’s argument
on the relative success of ‘indirect rule’, the Colombian state’s ‘strategy of rule’ in peripheral areas
characterized by a ‘thin bureaucracy and a thick system of partisan networks’ (2019, p. 15).
15. ‘Location’ rather than pages is what appears on the Kindle edition of this book.
16. For the summary of the ﬁnal agreement in English, see http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/
herramientas/Documents/summary-of-colombias-peace-agreement.pdf .
17. Vargas’ assessed the 2014 joint Peace Communique, before the agreement was signed.
18. Torres notes that the ﬁgure is still eight times lower than the national average, showing how extensively
marginalised Putumayo’s economy was.
19. See pageXII-94 of INSCR2001onhttps://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/, last accessed 28 January 2019.
20. After the passage of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act in the US in December 1999, and the
revisions in the Patriot Act in 2001, the SDNT was renamed Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List,
to include terrorists and corrupt oﬃcials. It became forbidden for US banks, ﬁrms and individuals to
transact business with those in the list, unless a special license is pre-acquired from OFAC.
21. See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/burma_fact_sheet_2016
1007.pdf
22. More details on the companies are available in Meehan (2015) and Chin and Zhang (2015). Further elab-
orations on the context on these companies are available in Meehan (2011) and in Woods (2011).
23. From the English translation of Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution available at https://www.constituteproject.
org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf, accessed 29 January 2019.
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